

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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REVIEWED by *Bob Hanes Jr.* DATE *3/16/63*
 CLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED *6/6/63*
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 FOI, EO or PA exemptions *(check)*

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

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Cuban crisis provided clear and ~~poorly understood~~ evidence, OADR of Soviet duplicity in action. In elaborate and clandestine effort to develop serious threat to U.S. and Western hemisphere security, Moscow used outright lies to Government of U.S. and to world as part of program to conceal its real intentions.

This experience underlines anew that pledges of Communist governments cannot safely be taken at face value. Additionally, it emphasizes necessity for controls and inspection in any major undertakings in the field of disarmament or arms control.

Facts of recent experience and lessons derived therefrom should be made clear to all governments, particularly those who have been inclined to accept Communists' words and promises. Methods and timing of this exercise in educative diplomacy and enlightenment of local media are matters for discretion of individual posts and mission chiefs.

EVIDENCE. TASS statement September 11 distributed worldwide said:

From: *M - WJorden: fjm* Date: *11/9/62*

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

M - George C. McGhee

Comments: *ACDA-Mr. Spiers*

ARA - Mr. Williams

S - The Secretary

EUR - Mr. Friedman

P - Mr. Burris

S/P - Mr. Lindley

FE - Mr. Usher

IO - Mr. Wilson

S/Asst. Secy. Thompson

AF - Mr. Foulon

(All clearances in draft)

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS

NEA - Mr. Lee

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UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *Julian* 07/07/70

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said:

"The Soviet Government has also authorized TASS to state that there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country--like Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force, and the Soviet Union has such powerful rockets to carry these warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union."

In talk with President on October 18, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko emphasized that Soviet military assistance to Cuba was "only defensive" and not of such character as could constitute threat to US. These Soviet assurances were reinforced and elaborated on through other official channels. The United States received the most explicit assurances that there were not and would not be missiles in Cuba capable of reaching the United States.

When photographs of Soviet missile bases in Cuba were first released, Soviet diplomats at number of overseas posts claimed they were "faked." Khrushchev himself cut ground from under this gambit with his own admissions few days later. Reminders of this ploy, particularly at posts

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where Soviet or other bloc representatives used it, should be particularly effective. Fact that bloc officials were misled or deliberately used should be noted.

Castro evidently misled Ben Bella on missile buildup during Algerian leader's visit Havana.

Guidance. Above should be used at your discretion and repeated frequently as opportunities present themselves. Purpose is to underline untrustworthiness of Communist pledges. It also provides counter to Soviet arguments praising Khrushchev's "restraint" by underlining that it was Soviet secret actions that precipitated crisis in first place. It should also be used extensively with those who heretofore have argued that pledges of good faith are enough in arms control measures or test ban. When making latter point, fact should be stressed that U.S., nevertheless, will continue its efforts for workable disarmament and test ban measures.

Cuban experience might also be related to past experiences with Soviet promises--e.g. on free elections in Eastern Europe, moratorium on nuclear testing, etc. You might also recall Lenin's advocacy of trickery as legitimate tool in attaining communism's ends.

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